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USING THE ARTEMIS ACCORDS TO BUILD CUSTOMARY
INTERNATIONAL LAW: A VISION FOR A U.S.-CENTRIC
GOOD GOVERNANCE REGIME IN OUTER SPACE
WALKER A. SMITH*

ABSTRACT
International space law is a relatively undeveloped field primarily occupied by the 1967 Outer Space Treaty (Treaty). This
Treaty, while long on general principles, is short on details.
With the United States’ recent push to return to the Moon by
2024 and send humans to Mars as soon as practicable after that,
the time has come to fill in the gaps of the Outer Space Treaty
out of necessity. The U.S. seeks to do this through the Artemis
Accords (the Accords).
This Comment argues that the U.S. should use the Accords to
develop a U.S.-centric legal and good governance regime in
outer space. It does so by identifying how the U.S. can use the
existing United Nations treaties on outer space—specifically the
Outer Space Treaty—to provide legitimacy to the Accords and
ultimately create state practice and opinio juris around the Accords, creating binding customary international law. This is the
best path forward to secure U.S. interests in outer space and
promote peace and stability in the final frontier.
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INTRODUCTION

A

NEW ERA IN SPACE exploration has begun. Through its
new Artemis Program, the U.S. seeks to send the first woman and the next man to the Moon by 2024, returning human
beings to the lunar surface for the first time since 1972.1 The
goal is to establish a sustainable human presence by the late
2020s, ultimately using the scientific and engineering knowledge gained on the Moon to launch the first crewed mission to
Mars, some 140 million miles away.2 With the private space industry in the U.S. booming and tensions with China at an alltime high, outer space is set to play a huge role in geopolitics
over the coming decades.3
This new space age will require a robust and comprehensive
legal framework to provide safety, stability, and predictability to
public and private actors in outer space. International space law
is a relatively nascent field that rests almost entirely on the
Outer Space Treaty of 1967 (the Treaty), which has been ratified by 110 countries, including the U.S., China, and Russia.4
While the Outer Space Treaty serves as a sort of constitution for
international space law, it speaks more to general principles and
1 NASA, ARTEMIS PLAN: NASA’S LUNAR EXPLORATION PROGRAM OVERVIEW 13,
22 (2020) [hereinafter ARTEMIS PLAN], https://www.nasa.gov/sites/default/
files/atoms/files/artemis_plan-20200921.pdf [https://perma.cc/2JYE-ZSHM].
2 Id. at 9.
3 Neel V. Patel, China’s Surging Private Space Industry is out to Challenge the US,
MIT TECH. REV. (Jan. 21, 2021), https://www.technologyreview.com/2021/01/
21/1016513/china-private-commercial-space-industry-dominance/ [https://
perma.cc/62PE-HQYX].
4 U.N. Off. for Outer Space Affs., Status of Int’l Agreements Relating to Activities in Outer Space as at 1 Jan. 2020, 6, 8–10, U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/C.2/2020/
CRP.10 (Jan. 1, 2020) [hereinafter Treaty Database], https://www.unoosa.org/
documents/pdf/spacelaw/treatystatus/TreatiesStatus-2020E.pdf [https://
perma.cc/JVR4-DFQ7].
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less to specific rules and requirements, leaving much open to
interpretation.5
To implement the Artemis Program, the U.S. chose to execute a series of bilateral agreements called the Artemis Accords
(the Accords).6 The Accords establish standards of conduct to
which the United States’ international partners—both private
and public—must adhere if they are going to collaborate with
the U.S. in this new and exciting age of space exploration.7 On
the one hand, the Accords serve an authentic and practical purpose: holding the United States’ partners to a high standard of
conduct and providing the specific, mission-level guidance
needed to actually implement the Artemis Program and send
humans back to the Moon.8 On the other hand, the Accords
play a much more subtle, important, and powerful role: allowing
the U.S. to establish a U.S.-centric legal regime and system of
good governance in outer space.
From the outset, the U.S. has characterized the Accords as
simply an outgrowth of the Outer Space Treaty—a way to operationalize and fill in the gaps of some of the Treaty’s more ambiguous and high-level provisions.9 Far from establishing new rules,
standards, or principles, the U.S. maintains that the Accords are
to be read in harmony with the Outer Space Treaty and derive
all of their legitimacy therefrom.10 By cloaking the Accords with
the authority and legitimacy of the Outer Space Treaty, the U.S.
seeks to convert the Accords into customary international law,
which would bind not only parties but also non-parties in their
5 See generally Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, opened for signature Jan. 27, 1967, 18 U.S.T. 2410, 610 U.N.T.S. 206
[hereinafter Outer Space Treaty] (outlining space practices like national responsibility and peaceful purposes).
6 NASA, THE ARTEMIS ACCORDS: PRINCIPLES FOR COOPERATION IN THE CIVIL EXPLORATION AND USE OF THE MOON, MARS, COMETS, AND ASTEROIDS FOR PEACEFUL
PURPOSES (2020) [hereinafter ARTEMIS ACCORDS], https://www.nasa.gov/specials/artemis-accords/img/Artemis-Accords-signed-13Oct2020.pdf [https://
perma.cc/9RM7-EFAE].
7 Id.; Christian Davenport, Seven Nations Join the U.S. in Signing the Artemis Accords, Creating a Legal Framework for Behavior in Space, WASH. POST (Oct. 13, 2020),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2020/10/13/artemis-moon-mining-agreement-signed/ [https://perma.cc/QK9H-C5C4].
8 Davenport, supra note 7.
9 See id.
10 Id. (“There is nothing in the Artemis Accords that isn’t enshrined in the
Outer Space Treaty. . . . It’s a forcing function to get nations to comply with the
Outer Space Treaty.”).
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conduct in outer space.11 The U.S. is uniquely positioned as the
first-mover in this context to begin building state practice and
opinio juris around the Accords, advancing the United States’ interpretation of the Outer Space Treaty, and ultimately establishing a U.S.-centric legal and governance regime in outer space.
This is the preferred course of action, as allowing China or Russia to decide these important questions could have wide-sweeping, negative implications and is essential if the U.S. will
dominate this next space age.
Part II of this Comment provides historical background on
space exploration and governance. Part III outlines the current
state of space law, focusing on the five United Nations (U.N.)
treaties on outer space and recent developments in U.S. domestic space law. Parts IV and V discuss the Artemis Program and
the Accords. Part VI analyzes how the U.S. can use the Accords
to build customary international law on resource extraction and
deconfliction of activities. Finally, Part VII discusses international reactions to the Accords.
II.

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

The Space Age began on October 4, 1957, when the Soviet
Union launched the world’s first artificial satellite, Sputnik 1.12
Sputnik 1 orbited Earth once every ninety-six minutes and transmitted radio signals for twenty-one days before burning up in
the atmosphere.13 The Sputnik 1 launch caught the U.S. by surprise and set off alarm bells within both government and society,
as fears began to percolate that the Soviet Union had achieved
technological superiority over the U.S.14 Less than a year later,
in direct response to the Soviets, the U.S. Congress passed the
National Aeronautics and Space Act creating the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), which was signed
11 Id. (“Precedent is important. . . . By embracing our values, along with our
partners, we’re creating a track record, a norm of behavior that will influence the
entire world to proceed with transparent, peaceful and safe exploration of
space.”).
12 Mark Garcia, 60 Years Ago, the Space Age Began, NASA (Oct. 5, 2017), https://
www.nasa.gov/feature/60-years-ago-the-space-age-began [https://perma.cc/
KE4C-RXEN].
13 The Space Race, DIGITAL HISTORY (2016) https://www.digitalhistory.uh.edu/
disp_textbook.cfm?smtid=2&psid=3426 [https://perma.cc/75LW-MGNU].
14 Michelle Getchell, The Start of the Space Race, KHAN ACADEMY, https://
www.khanacademy.org/humanities/us-history/postwarera/1950s-america/a/thestart-of-the-space-race [https://perma.cc/N7G4-N9N9].
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into law by President Eisenhower on July 29, 1958.15 “[NASA’s]
first task became the development of a human space exploration program, Project Mercury,” and remarkably, within twelve
years, the American astronaut Neil Armstrong became the first
person to set foot on the Moon.16
The launch of Sputnik 1 and the creation of NASA spurred the
international community to action. In late 1958, the U.N. General Assembly (General Assembly) established the Committee
on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (COPUOS), with eighteen
member states, to promote the peaceful use of outer space and
facilitate international cooperation around issues relating to
space law and policy.17 The General Assembly formally established COPUOS as a permanent committee the following year,
and since then, COPUOS has served as a:
focal point for international cooperation in the peaceful exploration and use of outer space, maintaining close contacts with governmental and non-governmental organizations concerned with
outer space activities, providing for exchange of information relating to outer space activities and assisting in the study of measures for the promotion of international cooperation.18

COPUOS has two subcommittees, the Scientific and Technical
Subcommittee and the Legal Subcommittee.19 The Committee
meets annually to consider important issues and submit reports
and recommendations to the General Assembly.20 Today,
COPUOS has ninety-five member states, making it one of the
largest committees in the U.N.21 The U.N.’s space policies are
implemented through the U.N. Office for Outer Space Affairs
(UNOOSA), and most multilateral space agreements have been
negotiated through COPUOS and adopted by the General Assembly.22 Thus, COPUOS is the preeminent forum for the negoROGER D. LAUNIUS, REACHING FOR THE MOON: A SHORT HISTORY OF THE
SPACE RACE 35–36 (2019).
16 Id.; see The Space Race, supra note 13.
17 COPUOS History, U.N. OFF. FOR OUTER SPACE AFFS., https://www.unoosa.
org/oosa/en/ourwork/copuos/history.html [https://perma.cc/S5MV-SEU9].
18 Id.
19 Id.
20 See id.
21 Members of the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, U.N. OFF. FOR
OUTER SPACE AFFS., https://www.unoosa.org/oosa/en/members/index.html
[https://perma.cc/6GHT-DUAT].
22 Space Law Treaties and Principles, UN OFF. FOR OUTER SPACE AFFAIRS, https://
www.unoosa.org/oosa/en/ourwork/spacelaw/treaties.html [https://perma.cc/
2P53-6A52].
15
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tiation and promulgation of international space law.23 COPUOS
concluded five international treaties on space law, “commonly
referred to as the five U.N. treaties on outer space,” which form
the backbone of international space law as it exists today.24
These five treaties are the Outer Space Treaty, the Rescue
Agreement, the Liability Convention, the Registration Convention, and the Moon Agreement.25 As an overview and introduction to the current state of the law, this Comment will consider
them in turn.
III.

CURRENT STATE OF THE LAW

The five U.N. treaties on outer space dominate international
space law. Additionally, the U.S. has recently begun constructing
a domestic legal framework to benefit its private space industry.
Understanding this legal landscape is critical for identifying how
the Accords draw on, change, and add to the existing space law
superstructure.
A.

THE OUTER SPACE TREATY

The Outer Space Treaty (formally the Treaty on Principles
Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of
Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies)26
is the cornerstone of international space law and “has been
called a constitution for outer space.”27 Primarily negotiated by
the U.S. and the Soviet Union as the dominant spacefaring nations, the Outer Space Treaty entered into force on October 10,
1967, and is primarily concerned with international peace and
security and lessening the threat of armed conflict in space.28
The Outer Space Treaty has been ratified by 110 countries, including Russia and China, and has been signed but not yet ratified by an additional 23 countries.29 Instead of laying out
specific, granular rules, the Outer Space Treaty establishes a set
of broad principles to govern human activity and international
See id.
Id.
25 Id.
26 Outer Space Treaty, supra note 5, at 2410.
27 Brian Wessel, The Rule of Law in Outer Space: The Effects of Treaties and Nonbinding Agreements on International Space Law, 35 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 289,
292 (2012).
28 Christopher Johnson, The Outer Space Treaty at 50, SPACE REV. (Jan. 23, 2017),
https://thespacereview.com/article/3155/1 [https://perma.cc/L2L3-J3JK].
29 Treaty Database, supra note 4, at 1, 6, 8, 10.
23
24
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relations in outer space.30 These broad principles are reflected
by the fact that the Outer Space Treaty contains only seventeen
articles,31 in contrast to a more comprehensive agreement like
the U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea, which “comprises
320 articles and nine annexes.”32 The Outer Space Treaty’s universal, high-level nature has no doubt contributed to its widespread acceptance and continuing hegemony in the sphere of
international space law.
Article I of the Outer Space Treaty establishes that outer
space is the “province of all mankind,” and as such there “shall
be free access to all areas of celestial bodies” and the exploration and use of such “shall be carried out for the benefit and in
the interests of all countries.”33 Article II provides that outer
space—which includes the Moon and other celestial bodies—”is
not subject to national appropriation,” meaning that although
the American flag is planted on the Moon, neither the U.S. nor
any other country can claim the Moon or any other celestial
body as sovereign territory.34 Article IV reserves the use of outer
space “exclusively for peaceful purposes” and prohibits weapons
of mass destruction (e.g., nuclear weapons) from being placed
in outer space.35 Article V requires states to render “all possible
assistance” to astronauts of other countries, both in space and
after landing back on Earth, especially “in the event of accident,
distress, or emergency landing.”36 Article VI provides that states
must assume responsibility for national activities in outer space,
including those undertaken by the private sector (e.g., the U.S.
is ultimately liable for what Space X does in outer space).37 Article IX requires states to conduct their activities in outer space
“with due regard to the corresponding interests of all other
State Parties to the Treaty,” and imposes upon states whose activities may cause “harmful interference” with another state’s space
activities a duty to “undertake appropriate international consultations before proceeding with any such activity.”38 Article XII
reinforces Article I’s free access theme and requires that all ceSee Outer Space Treaty, supra note 5, at 2410–21.
Id.
32 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833
U.N.T.S. 397.
33 Outer Space Treaty, supra note 5, at 2412–13.
34 Id. at 2413.
35 Id. at 2413–14.
36 Id. at 2414.
37 Id. at 2415.
38 Id. at 2416–17.
30
31
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lestial installations be open to representatives of other states “on
a basis of reciprocity.”39
Thus, the main themes of the Outer Space Treaty are free
access and use, no national appropriation, peaceful purposes
only, due regard, and avoidance of harmful interference. These
principles have generated relatively little debate over the past
fifty-four years. The Outer Space Treaty is notably silent, however, on the issue of resource exploitation, and different countries have interpreted this silence differently.40 These
fundamental principles of the Outer Space Treaty are well established and respected, and many experts in international law believe they exist “as an entirely different set of legal rules, outside
of the textual treaty, as ‘customary’ international law. And, as
customary international law, the Outer Space Treaty reflects
rules that bind even those states who are not formal parties to
the treaty itself.”41 It is safe to say that the Outer Space Treaty is
the touchstone and source of legitimacy for all other international space law.
B.

THE RESCUE AGREEMENT

Although Article V of the Outer Space Treaty requires states
to render “all possible assistance” to astronauts in distress,42
some COPUOS member states (specifically the U.S. and the Soviet Union), immediately after the Outer Space Treaty was completed, “realized their interests in protecting astronauts and
recovering space objects demanded further elaboration and refinement, and took further steps to achieve them.”43 This gave
rise to the Agreement on the Rescue of Astronauts, the Return
of Astronauts and the Return of Objects Launched into Outer
Space, colloquially known as the Rescue Agreement, which entered into force on December 3, 1968.44 At present, ninety-eight
countries have ratified the Agreement, twenty-three countries
have signed it but have yet to ratify, and three international intergovernmental organizations (the European Space Agency,
Id. at 2418.
See infra Sections III.E, III.F.
41 Johnson, supra note 28.
42 Outer Space Treaty, supra note 5, at 2414.
43 Frans G. von der Dunk, A Sleeping Beauty Awakens: The 1968 Rescue Agreement
After Forty Years, 34 J. SPACE L. 411, 415–18 (2008).
44 Id. at 418; Agreement on the Rescue of Astronauts, the Return of Astronauts
and the Return of Objects Launched into Outer Space, opened for signature Apr.
22, 1968, 19 U.S.T. 7570, 672 U.N.T.S. 119 [hereinafter Rescue Agreement].
39
40
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the Intersputnik International Organization of Space Communications, and the European Organization for the Exploitation of
Meteorological Satellites) have declared their acceptance of the
rights and obligations conferred by the Agreement.45
The Rescue Agreement begins by acknowledging that it seeks
to “develop and give further concrete expression to [the] duties” laid out in the Outer Space Treaty, drawing a direct link
between the two treaties.46 Article 1 requires states to notify both
the Secretary-General of the U.N. and the launching source (if
identifiable) where the states learned that “the personnel of a
spacecraft have suffered an accident or are experiencing conditions of distress or have made an emergency or unintended
landing.”47 Article 2 requires states to “take all possible steps” to
rescue the personnel of a spacecraft that lands in their territory
due to distress or accident.48 Article 3 extends this rescue requirement to the high seas, requiring those states that are in a
position to render aid to do so.49 Article 4 elaborates by requiring that rescued personnel be returned “safely and promptly” to
“representatives of the launching authority.”50 Article 5 requires
that states help recover and return any “space object or its component parts” found within its jurisdiction, thus extending the
duty to rescue and return to equipment and parts as well.51 Importantly, Article 5 also provides that “expenses incurred in fulfilling obligations to recover and return a space object or its
component parts . . . shall be borne by the launching
authority.”52
While the Rescue Agreement is intended to clarify and elaborate on the Outer Space Treaty, it differs in a few respects and
contains some ambiguity of its own. Whereas Article V of the
Outer Space Treaty imposes a requirement to render “all possible assistance,” it applies only to “astronauts.”53 The language of
the Rescue Agreement refers to “personnel of a spacecraft.”54
“[P]ersonnel of a spacecraft” appears to be a more inclusive definition, but it is still unclear who exactly qualifies. For example,
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54

Treaty Database, supra note 4, at 1, 10.
Rescue Agreement, supra note 44, at 7572.
Id. at 7573.
Id.
Id. at 7574.
Id. at 7575.
Id.
Id.
Outer Space Treaty, supra note 5, at 2414.
Rescue Agreement, supra note 44, at 7573.
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would a space tourist be covered by the Rescue Agreement, or
only the crew (who fit more neatly within the traditional conception of “personnel”)? Article 5 of the Rescue Agreement also
adds to the Outer Space Treaty, specifically providing that the
launching state must compensate the state that recovers and returns the launching state’s space object or its parts that land in
the other state’s territory.55 While this too is a positive innovation, the Rescue Agreement is silent on who bears the cost burden of rescuing and returning astronauts or “personnel of a
spacecraft,” which could lead to future conflict between states if
the Rescue Agreement is invoked in such a scenario.56 The Rescue Agreement is an important, albeit underutilized treaty, that
goes out of its way to highlight its connection to the Outer
Space Treaty—the cornerstone of international space law—even
though the Rescue Agreement was only passed a year after the
Outer Space Treaty.
C.

THE LIABILITY CONVENTION

The next treaty to come out of the U.N. COPUOS was the
Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by
Space Objects (the Liability Convention).57 The Liability Convention entered into force on September 1, 1972, and ninetyeight states have ratified it, nineteen states have signed but not
yet ratified, and four international intergovernmental organizations (the European Space Agency, the Intersputnik International Organization of Space Communications, the European
Organization for the Exploitation of Meteorological Satellites,
and the European Telecommunications Satellite Organization)
have accepted the rights and obligations thereunder.58
Not surprisingly, the Liability Convention opens by acknowledging its outgrowth from the Outer Space Treaty and its purpose: to elaborate on Article VII of the Treaty.59 Article II
provides that launching states are “absolutely liable” for damage
caused by their space objects on the surface of the Earth or to
aircraft flight.60 Article III explains that in the slightly different
Id.
See id.
57 Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects,
opened for signature Mar. 29, 1972, 24 U.S.T. 2389, 961 U.N.T.S. 187 [hereinafter
Liability Convention].
58 Treaty Database, supra note 4, at 1, 10.
59 Liability Convention, supra note 57, at 2391.
60 Id. at 2392.
55
56
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case of damage caused to a space object or its contents by a
space object of another launching state, the launching state
shall be liable “only if the damage is due to its fault,” essentially
a negligence standard.61 Articles IV and V state that if two states
combine to injure a third state, each of the two states is jointly
and severally liable under the same standards as above.62 Article
VI releases a state from liability if it can show that “the damage
has resulted either wholly or partially from gross negligence or
from an act or omission done with intent to cause damage on
the part of a claimant State.”63
The Liability Convention has been invoked only one time: in
1978, when the Soviet satellite Cosmos 954 crash-landed in uninhabited Canadian territory.64 However, during subsequent negotiations between the Canadians and the Soviets, the Liability
Convention only played a background role, causing some commentators to question its effectiveness.65 The Liability Convention has also come under fire for creating a regime where,
essentially, “a state’s responsibility to pay for damage is not
linked to proximate causation or its own actions, but instead to
mere ownership or assistance in launching the object.”66 Now
that outer space is a much more crowded and complex domain
than in the 1970s, it is perhaps time to update the liability regime that currently governs outer space. This would be a worthwhile project for the U.S. and its partners to pursue through
COPUOS.
D.

THE REGISTRATION CONVENTION

Three years after the Liability Convention came the related
Convention on Registration of Objects Launched into Outer
Space (the Registration Convention).67 The Registration Convention is an outgrowth of the Outer Space Treaty (specifically
Article VIII), the Rescue Agreement, and the Liability Convention, and provides states with a means to assist in identifying
Id.
Id. at 2393
63 Id. at 2394.
64 Trevor Kehrer, Closing the Liability Loophole: The Liability Convention and the
Future of Conflict in Space, 20 CHI. J. INT’L L. 178, 185 (2019).
65 Id. at 185–86.
66 Id. at 178.
67 Convention on Registration of Objects Launched into Outer Space, opened
for signature Jan. 14, 1975, 28 U.S.T. 695, 1023 U.N.T.S. 15 [hereinafter Registration Convention].
61
62
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space objects.68 Sixty-nine states have ratified the Registration
Convention, three have signed it but have yet to ratify it, and the
four main international intergovernmental organizations (listed
in the Section above) have accepted the rights and obligations
thereunder.69 While fewer states have ratified the Registration
Convention as compared to the previous three treaties, its signatories do include all the major space powers, and this makes
sense because the Registration Convention is “directly relevant
especially for those states actually launching objects into outer
space,” which is still a minority of states.70
Article II of the Registration Convention requires states to
maintain their own registries of objects they launch into space,
and Article III requires the Secretary-General to maintain another such registry.71 Article IV requires states to submit the following information to the Secretary-General: (1) “[n]ame of
launching State or States,” (2) “[a]n appropriate designator of
the space object or its registration number,” (3) the date and
location of launch, (4) “[b]asic orbital parameters of the object,” and (5) “[g]eneral function of the space object.”72 Article
VI provides that if a state cannot identify a space object that has
caused it damage, other states must assist in identifying the
object.73
The Registration Convention thus helps implement the Outer
Space Treaty, the Rescue Agreement, and the Liability Convention by providing a mechanism through which space objects can
be readily identified—either for purposes of rescue and return
or to facilitate claims for damages if a space object lands in another state’s territory.74 The Registration Convention has been
criticized for not providing enough incentive for states without
launching capabilities to ratify, which would increase its effectiveness and coverage.75 The Registration Convention imposes a
duty to assist other states in identifying space objects (Article VI)
Convention on Registration of Objects Launched into Outer Space, U.N. OFF. FOR
OUTER SPACE AFFS., https://www.unoosa.org/oosa/en/ourwork/spacelaw/treaties/introregistration-convention.html [https://perma.cc/L8PL-GYBN].
69 Treaty Database, supra note 4, at 2, 10.
70 See id; Frans G. von der Dunk, The Registration Convention: Background and
Historical Context, 32 SPACE, CYBER, AND TELECOMMS. L. PROGRAM FAC. PUBL’NS
450, 450 (2003).
71 Registration Convention, supra note 67, at 698–99.
72 Id. at 699–700.
73 Id. at 700–01.
74 See id. at 698–701.
75 See von der Dunk, supra note 70, at 451.
68
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without providing any real benefit to non-spacefaring nations in
return.76 Reforming the Registration Convention substantively
to provide more benefits to non-spacefaring nations would be a
worthwhile undertaking to increase the level of ratification,
which would benefit the entire scheme.
E.

THE MOON AGREEMENT

The last of the five U.N. treaties on outer space is the Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the Moon and Other
Celestial Bodies (the Moon Agreement), which entered into
force on July 11, 1984.77 The Moon Agreement is by far the
weakest of the U.N. treaties, with only eighteen states having ratified it, and another four states having signed but not yet ratified
it.78 Importantly, none of the three major spacefaring nations
(U.S., Russia, and China) have signed, acceded, or ratified the
Moon Agreement, causing many experts to conclude “that it is a
failure from the standpoint of international law.”79 Furthermore, unless more states decide to ratify the Moon Agreement,
it is unlikely to generate any customary international law. However, because it is an official U.N. treaty, it is unwise for countries to ignore the Moon Agreement entirely.
Article 1 states that the Moon Agreement applies to the Moon
and other celestial bodies, excluding Earth.80 Article 3 establishes that the Moon shall be used “exclusively for peaceful purposes” and prohibits nuclear weapons and military installations
and activities on the Moon and other celestial bodies.81 Article 4
states that the “exploration and use of the [M]oon shall be the
province of all mankind,” and Article 5 requires states to inform
the Secretary-General and the public about any planned activities on the Moon or other celestial bodies.82 Article 11 is the
most contentious section of the Moon Agreement, which is
probably why most major countries have declined to accede to
Registration Convention, supra note 67, at 700–01.
Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, opened for signature Dec. 18, 1979, 1363 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter Moon
Agreement].
78 Treaty Database, supra note 4, at 2, 10.
79 Id. at 6, 8–10; Michael Listner, The Moon Treaty: Failed International Law or
Waiting in the Shadows?, SPACE REV. (Oct. 24, 2011), https://
www.thespacereview.com/article/1954/1 [https://perma.cc/D7XD-NXTD].
80 Moon Agreement, supra note 77, at 22.
81 Id. at 23.
82 Id.
76
77
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its terms.83 Article 11 states that “the Moon and its natural resources are the common heritage of mankind”; that “the
[M]oon is not subject to national appropriation”; and that exploitation of the Moon’s natural resources is prohibited except
through an international regime set up “to govern the exploitation of natural resources” on the Moon, which has yet to be established.84 The other provisions incorporate some of the more
benign parts of the Outer Space Treaty, including free use and
movement and state responsibility for national activities on the
Moon.85
While the Outer Space Treaty itself is silent on the issue of
exploitation of lunar resources, leading to the inference that resource exploitation could be allowed under the Outer Space
Treaty, the Moon Agreement specifically prohibits lunar natural
resource exploitation except through an international regime
that has yet to be established.86 Because lunar resource exploitation is so critical and potentially lucrative, it has generated much
controversy. As such, superpowers like the U.S. and China are
wary of binding themselves to any commitments that may hinder
their ability to gain an advantage in this sphere.87 It is also important to note that Australia is the only country that is a party
to both the Moon Agreement and the Accords, and it is unclear
to what degree the Moon Agreement and the Accords can
coexist.88
F.

U.S. DOMESTIC SPACE LAW

It is also helpful to understand recent developments in U.S.
domestic space law. Of particular importance considering the
five treaties just discussed is the U.S. Commercial Space Launch
Competitiveness Act, signed into law by President Barack
Obama on November 25, 2015.89 One of the most publicized
contributions of this law is that it establishes a statutory basis for
See Listner, supra note 79.
Moon Agreement, supra note 77, at 25.
85 See id. at 26, 28.
86 Id. at 25; see generally Outer Space Treaty, supra note 5.
87 See Sarah Coffey, Note, Establishing a Legal Framework for Property Rights to Natural Resources in Outer Space, 41 CASE W. RSRV. J. INT’L L. 119, 121, 123, 128
(2009).
88 Jack Wright Nelson, The Artemis Accords and the Future of International Space
Law, 24 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. 31, 4 (Dec. 10, 2020), https://www.asil.org/insights/
volume/24/issue/31/artemis-accords-and-future-international-space-law [https:/
/perma.cc/B5VG-8QNV].
89 Pub. L. No. 114-90, 129 Stat. 704 (2015).
83
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private space resource exploitation.90 The critical paragraph in
the title concerning space resources states:
A United States citizen engaged in commercial recovery of an
asteroid resource or a space resource under this chapter shall be
entitled to any asteroid resource or space resource obtained, including to possess, own, transport, use, and sell the asteroid resource or space resource obtained in accordance with applicable
law, including the international obligations of the United
States.91

Thus, with the passage of the Commercial Space Launch Competitiveness Act, the U.S. has clarified its position on space resource exploitation: all systems go. The United States’ position
is that for-profit resource extraction on the Moon and other celestial bodies does not violate Article II of the Outer Space
Treaty’s non-appropriation provision, which is certainly far from
settled under current international space law.92 The bill was met
with almost unanimous praise from the United States’ private
space sector.93 Rick Tumlinson, chairman of Deep Space Industries, said, “We are pleased to see the beginnings of legal clarity
in the field of space resource utilization.”94 Chris Lewicki, president of Planetary Resources, stated that the bill “fuels a new
economy that will open many avenues for the continual growth
and prosperity of humanity.”95 The issue of space resource exploitation is one of the most contentious in all of space law and
one that the U.S. confronts head-on in the Accords.
An Executive Order issued by President Donald Trump also
reinforces the United States’ position on space resources. The
Executive Order, entitled “Encouraging International Support
for the Recovery and Use of Space Resources,” was issued on
April 6, 2020, and affirms support for the public and private use
of space resources.96 The Executive Order acknowledges that as
the U.S. looks toward establishing a long-term presence on the
Moon and ultimately going to Mars, it will require partnership
90 Cody Knipfer, Congress and Commerce in the Final Frontier (Part 2), SPACE REV.
(Dec. 17, 2018), https://www.thespacereview.com/article/3625/1 [https://
perma.cc/W9RR-N3CW].
91 U.S. Commercial Space Launch Competitiveness Act § 51303.
92 See ARTEMIS ACCORDS, supra note 6, at 4.
93 Jeff Foust, U.S. Senate Passes Compromise Commercial Space Bill, SPACE NEWS
(Nov. 11, 2015), https://spacenews.com/u-s-senate-passes-compromise-commercial-space-bill/ [https://perma.cc/NK4H-SCZQ].
94 Id.
95 Id.
96 Exec. Order No. 13,914, 85 Fed. Reg. 20,381 (Apr. 6, 2020).
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with private companies to extract resources necessary for astronauts to live off the land.97 It notes that the Moon Agreement
creates uncertainty in this area, and the Moon Agreement’s interaction with the Outer Space Treaty only deepens this confusion.98 The Executive Order goes on to state quite emphatically
that “the United States does not view [space] as a global commons. Accordingly, it shall be the policy of the United States to
encourage international support for the public and private recovery and use of resources in outer space, consistent with applicable law.”99 Section 2 reflects the United States’ rejection of the
Moon Agreement and directs the Secretary of State to “object to
any attempt . . . to treat the Moon Agreement as reflecting or
otherwise expressing customary international law.”100 As one
commercial space law practitioner observed, “The executive order is best viewed as maintaining and strengthening a position
that the United States has held for decades.”101
With a new administration in office as of January 20, 2021, the
future of U.S. space policy is less certain. Still, experts agree that
the Biden administration is unlikely to depart significantly from
the policies and positions of its predecessor regarding outer
space.102 Dr. Bleddyn Bowen, a scholar on space policy, predicts
that “[r]hetoric will likely soften, but the substance of military
and economic self-interest of the US in space will continue unabated.”103 One area where change may occur is in the United
States’ environmental policy in outer space.104 The Biden administration is likely to place a greater emphasis on the environmental protection of outer space and celestial bodies, mirroring
its domestic priorities on such issues (signaled by the administration’s rejoining of The Paris Agreement), which could proId.
See id.
99 Id.
100 Id.
101 Paul Stimers, The President’s Space Resources Executive Order: A Step in the Right
Direction, SPACE REV. (Apr. 20, 2020), https://www.thespacereview.com/article/
3925/1 [https://perma.cc/3LUT-JB7F].
102 Bleddyn Bowen, Biden-Harris Space Policy: Building on the Space Force and Artemis, SPACEWATCH.GLOB. (Jan. 20, 2021), https://spacewatch.global/2021/01/
spacewatchgl-column-biden-harris-space-policy-building-on-the-space-force-andartemis/ [https://perma.cc/QSL2-QX9B].
103 Id.
104 Jeffrey Kluger, The Biden Presidency Could Fundamentally Change the U.S. Space
Program, TIME (Jan. 29, 2021, 8:00 AM), https://time.com/5933447/biden-spacenasa/ [https://perma.cc/Y68N-DSLP].
97
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vide further opportunities for collaboration with partner nations
going forward.105
IV.

THE ARTEMIS PROGRAM

This Section discusses the phases and components of the Artemis Program, which is NASA’s bold new vision to return
humans to the Moon, and eventually to Mars. Phase One is to
return human beings to the Moon by 2024.106 This 2024 deadline has recently been put in doubt due to many factors, including the COVID-19 pandemic and the change in U.S.
administration.107 It is unlikely that the new administration will
abandon the Artemis Program even though it has former-President Trump’s fingerprints all over it—the Program enjoys widespread support in Congress, and too much diplomatic and
political capital has been expended getting it off the ground.108
If anything, the timeline on the Artemis Program is likely to be
extended.
Phase Two of the Artemis Program involves establishing a
long-term human presence on the Moon, with a target date of
the late 2020s to early 2030s.109 Critical to this goal will be the
Lunar Gateway, a small space station that orbits the Moon and
serves as a base for the astronauts when they are exploring the
lunar surface—similar to the International Space Station, but
not permanently crewed.110 Additionally, accessing the water ice
at the Moon’s south pole is critical to establishing a sustainable
human presence on the Moon.111 There was debate over
whether resources should be expended on voyages to the Moon
or Mars for a long time.112 The conventional wisdom was that
Bowen, supra note 102.
ARTEMIS PLAN, supra note 1, at 13.
107 Kristin Fisher & Ashley Strickland, NASA Watchdog Says Return of Astronauts
to Moon by 2024 ‘Not Feasible’ Due to Spacesuit Delays, CNN, https://www.cnn.com/
2021/08/10/world/nasa-artemis-moon-landing-delay-scn/index.html [https://
perma.cc/35VJ-AJLW] (Aug. 10, 2021, 3:37 PM); Bowen, supra note 102.
108 Kluger, supra note 104.
109 See ARTEMIS PLAN, supra note 1, at 53.
110 Trevor English, The Lunar Gateway is NASA’s Stepping Stone to Lunar Habitation, INTERESTING ENGINEERING (Nov. 10, 2020), https://interestingengineering.
com/the-lunar-gateway-is-nasas-stepping-stone-to-lunar-habitation [https://
perma.cc/FGL8-ZNXA].
111 VIPER
Mission Overview, NASA, https://www.nasa.gov/viper/overview
[https://perma.cc/34L7-FWJ5].
112 See Greg Autry, Oh No, Not Again: The Moon vs. Mars, FORBES (Jan. 26, 2021,
12:44 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/gregautry/2021/01/26/oh-no-notagain-the-moon-vs-mars/?sh=2e6f7a957e56 [https://perma.cc/9PL5-AMDA].
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every dollar spent on the Moon was a dollar not spent on Mars,
and vice versa.113 However, this thinking has evolved, and now
many experts recognize that, for humans to travel to Mars, lessons must first be learned by establishing a sustainable human
presence on the Moon.114 Thus, the main goal of long-term
presence on the Moon is to gain the scientific and engineering
expertise necessary to get humans to Mars and to sustain them
when they get there.115
Phase Three is sending the first crew to Mars, which is 140
million miles away from Earth (compared to the Moon’s distance of 250,000 miles).116 This is an extremely ambitious and
challenging undertaking, so no timeline has been set.117 Much
remains unknown about what it will take to accomplish this goal,
which is why the immediate focus is on returning to the Moon
and establishing a sustainable long-term presence there so that
astronauts, scientists, and engineers can learn what it will take to
land on Mars.118 Such an endeavor will undoubtedly require the
U.S. to marshal the resources of all of our international and private sector partners.
The Artemis Program thus represents the boldest U.S. space
exploration plan in recent history, with tremendous potential to
develop scientific and engineering expertise and the U.S. domestic private space industry. To achieve this bold vision, the
U.S. will need to partner with our allies across the globe and do
so through the Accords.
V.

THE ARTEMIS ACCORDS

On October 13, 2020, the U.S. unveiled the Accords, aiming
to establish a common set of principles to govern the civil exploration and use of outer space.119 The Accords represent NASA’s
vision “to create a safe and transparent environment which facilitates exploration, science, and commercial activities for all of
113 Space Ct. Found., Artemis Accords ⎮ Volume II ⎮ The Future of Space Governance
⎮ SCFVideo 4, YOUTUBE, at 22:46 (Jan.15, 2021), https://www.youtube.com/
watch?v=STdrBjrzrqk [https://perma.cc/95Y8-KU6G].
114 See id. at 8:44–58.
115 ARTEMIS PLAN, supra note 1, at 26, 30–31.
116 Id. at 9, 26.
117 See id. at 31.
118 Id. at 28–31.
119 ARTEMIS ACCORDS, supra note 6, at 7.
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humanity to enjoy.”120 Originally negotiated among the U.S. and
seven of its international partners, the Accords serve as a
roadmap for implementing the Artemis Program.121 While more
specific, mission-level details will be spelled out in individual bilateral agreements that NASA will execute with its partner agencies, the Accords seek to reaffirm several principles enunciated
in the five U.N. treaties on outer space and a few principles not
explicitly mentioned in those treaties but perhaps found in the
penumbra of the Agreement.122 The original parties to the Accords are the U.S., United Kingdom, Australia, Canada, Japan,
Luxembourg, the United Arab Emirates, and Italy.123 Ukraine
has joined since the original signing, and Brazil has signed a
letter of intent to join.124 This is a diverse group of countries,
from Japan—which has long been a partner on the International Space Station—to countries like Australia and the United
Arab Emirates, with relatively new space programs.125 The Accords set out ten principles for space exploration, which this
Comment will examine in turn.
The first principle of the Accords is that all activities conducted under them “should be exclusively for peaceful purposes
and in accordance with relevant international law.”126 This principle serves two purposes. First, it incorporates and reaffirms Article IV of the Outer Space Treaty’s mandate that outer space
shall be used “exclusively for peaceful purposes,” a relatively
noncontroversial baseline principle.127 Second, it provides a
general assurance that nothing in the Accords intends to replace or be in derogation of existing international law.128 This
section uses the permissive “should” language instead of the
mandatory “shall” or “must” language, which is something that
120 Principles for a Safe, Peaceful, and Prosperous Future, NASA, https://
www.nasa.gov/specials/artemis-accords/index.html [https://perma.cc/RVS59QA7].
121 Davenport, supra note 7.
122 ARTEMIS ACCORDS, supra note 6, at 1–2
123 Davenport, supra note 7.
124 Ukraine Ninth Country to Sign Artemis Accords, SPACEWATCH.GLOB. (Nov. 15,
2020), https://spacewatch.global/2020/11/ukraine-ninth-country-to-sign-artemis-accords/ [https://perma.cc/6SPR-6Q5R]; NASA Administrator Signs Statement
of Intent with Brazil on Artemis Cooperation, NASA, https://www.nasa.gov/feature/
nasa-administrator-signs-statement-of-intent-with-brazil-on-artemis-cooperation
[https://perma.cc/MEJ6-GFFR] (Dec. 14, 2020).
125 Davenport, supra note 7.
126 ARTEMIS ACCORDS, supra note 6, at 3.
127 Outer Space Treaty, supra note 5, at 2413–14.
128 See ARTEMIS ACCORDS, supra note 6, at 3.
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critics may hone in on to ascribe nefarious intent to NASA and
the Accords.129
The second principle is transparency.130 This section requires
that states publicly release information about their space policies and plans and any scientific data gathered from their activities.131 This accords with Article XI of the Outer Space Treaty,
which imposes an obligation on states to inform “the public and
the international scientific community . . . of the nature, conduct, locations and results of such activities.”132 Mike Gold, Associate Administrator for Space Policy and Partnerships at NASA
and one of the main architects of the Accords, noted that “transparency is so important to avoiding conflict that so many of our
terrestrial conflicts are based on misperceptions, lack of communication, and confusion, which is why we’re asking any country
who joins the Artemis Accords to just be public about what their
plans are, what their policies are.”133 While this may seem noncontroversial, transparency has very different meanings depending on where one is in the world; NASA’s making transparency
an explicit requirement of the Accords is a good step towards
holding countries to a high standard. Requiring the United
Arab Emirates, for example, to be transparent in its space policies and programs could have spillover effects and begin to
build a culture of transparency within the government, which
the U.S. should strive to promote.
The third principle of the Accords is interoperability.134 This
principle is born of a recognition that interoperability and compatibility of systems and hardware will “enhance space-based exploration, scientific discovery, and commercial utilization,”
ultimately promoting harmony and creating a fertile environment for investment and development.135 Signatories to the Accords commit to using “reasonable efforts” to utilize and
develop interoperability standards for space-based infrastructure.136 The Outer Space Treaty does not mention interoperability. It remains to be seen how successful the U.S. will be in
arguing that interoperability is within the spirit of the Outer
129
130
131
132
133
134
135
136

See id.
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Space Treaty, which would lend more weight to the practice as
customary international law. It could also be argued that interoperability helps implement the Rescue Agreement, as it would
allow for safer, more expeditious and effective provision of aid
in distress situations.
Dovetailing neatly with interoperability is the fourth principle
of the Accords: emergency assistance.137 This section commits
the signatories to taking “all reasonable efforts to render necessary assistance to personnel in outer space who are in distress,”
and explicitly acknowledges the obligations imposed by the Rescue Agreement.138 This section is a hybrid of the Rescue Agreement and Article V of the Outer Space Treaty. It uses slightly
different language than the Rescue Agreement, which refers to
“personnel of a spacecraft”139 instead of “personnel in outer
space”140 (both are more expansive than the Outer Space
Treaty’s “astronauts”).141 As discussed above, there is some uncertainty regarding who exactly qualifies as “personnel of a
spacecraft” under the Rescue Agreement, and NASA seems to
have perpetuated this uncertainty by using the term personnel,
leaving unclear whether these provisions cover space tourists.
The fifth principle of the Accords is the registration of space
objects.142 This provision reinforces the importance of the Registration Convention, providing another link between the Accords
and existing treaty law.143 As Mike Gold noted, “Registration is
the foundation that everything else is built upon. We can’t get to
issues of liability, we can’t deconflict activities properly if we’re
not following registration.”144 He framed the Accords as a way to
enforce compliance with the Registration Convention and said
that NASA is urging partners that are not a party to that Treaty
to “become a member with alacrity.”145
Principle six is the release of scientific data.146 This section
commits the signatories to “the open sharing of scientific data,”
with appropriate protections for proprietary and export-controlled information, and exempts private sector operations from
137
138
139
140
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143
144
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this requirement.147 Since the beginning, the release of scientific data has been a practice at NASA, and the Accords seek to
promote widespread adherence to this practice as a norm of international space law.148 Release of scientific data is not explicitly in the Outer Space Treaty, but in casting the release of
scientific data as an obligation under that Treaty, NASA has emphasized its belief that it is “very much in the spirit of the [Outer
Space Treaty].”149 Again, it remains to be seen how successful
NASA will be in enshrining principles of the Accords in international law that are not explicitly rooted in the Outer Space
Treaty.
The seventh principle is “preserving outer space heritage.”150
This section defines outer space heritage as “historically significant human or robotic landing sites, artifacts, spacecraft, and
other evidence of activity on celestial bodies.”151 This is another
idea that is not included in the Outer Space Treaty.152 NASA has
stated that “we want to try and protect our heritage just like we
do here on Earth, where we honor our historic sites or historic
artifacts. We need to do the same on the [M]oon.”153 The seventh principle is a relatively noncontroversial and somewhat secondary principle of the Accords. Still, it could be perceived as a
Trojan horse for limited national appropriation, especially because most heritage sites on the Moon relate to the United
States’ history of lunar exploration.
The eighth, and by far the most controversial, principle outlined in the Accords relates to exploiting space resources.154 The
Accords provide that “the extraction and utilization of space resources . . . should be executed in a manner that complies with
the Outer Space Treaty and in support of safe and sustainable
space activities.”155 They also explicitly affirm “that the extraction of space resources does not inherently constitute national
appropriation under Article II of the Outer Space
Treaty . . . .”156 This is a controversial contention because a large
147
148
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contingent of nations do not believe that space resource exploitation can be consistent with the Outer Space Treaty.157 As
such, this section is a clear example of the U.S. using the Accords to advance its interpretation of the Outer Space Treaty
under international law. Of particular relevance are Articles II,
VI, and XI of the Outer Space Treaty, which prohibit national
appropriation, assign international responsibility for national activities, and require the disclosure of information surrounding
activities in outer space.158
The reality of any expedition or exploration, in outer space or
otherwise, requires living off the land. Space resource extraction
will be necessary if human beings are to establish a sustainable
long-term presence on the lunar surface and, ultimately, make
the voyage to Mars. Other countries cannot seriously contest this
practical reality, but they can contest that the U.S. seems to be
using the Accords to unilaterally decide how to conduct space
resource extraction and what it will look like. The success of the
United States’ advanced private space industry rests heavily
upon a legal framework established to regulate resource extraction in outer space.
Another area of contention is resource extraction vis-à-vis the
Moon Agreement. The Moon Agreement allows the exploitation
of the Moon’s natural resources only through an international
regime set up by the states to govern the exploitation of natural
resources on the Moon, which has yet to be established.159 Recall that the Moon Agreement is regarded by many as a failed
treaty (with only eighteen states having ratified it).160 The U.S.
has specifically repudiated that the Moon Agreement reflects
customary international law.161 On their face, the Accords seem
to conflict directly with the Moon Agreement. However, Australia is a signatory of both the Moon Agreement and the Accords,
which means there may be room for an interpretation of the two
without conflict.162 Indeed, Mike Gold stated that “[e]ven for
the Moon Agreement nations like Australia, I also don’t see any
conflict there between the Moon Agreement and what’s stated
in the Accords in terms of legal principle: that the Moon AgreeRossana Deplano, The Artemis Accords: Evolution or Revolution in International
Space Law?, 70 INT’L & COMPAR. L. Q. 799, 807–08 (2021).
158 Outer Space Treaty, supra note 5, at 2413, 2415, 2418.
159 Moon Agreement, supra note 77, at 25.
160 See supra Section III.E.
161 Exec. Order No. 13,914, 85 Fed. Reg. 20,381 (Apr. 6, 2020).
162 Nelson, supra note 88, at 4.
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ment anticipates the extraction and utilization of resources.”163
He went on, however, to note that “[w]here there would be a
difference is relative to what the regulatory regime should look
like and what a sharing regime might look like for those resources, and we couldn’t establish common ground around
those topics . . . .”164 In a way, having Australia as a partner in
the Artemis Program helps the U.S. advance its ideas regarding
resource extraction in outer space because Australia’s participation in the Moon Agreement bolsters the notion that nothing in
the Accords conflicts with existing treaties.
The ninth principle of the Accords relates to the deconfliction of activities in outer space.165 This section immediately references the Outer Space Treaty’s “provisions relat[ed] to due
regard and harmful interference” and states that signatories
commit to using due regard in outer space and avoid harmful
interference with other nations.166 It also provides that signatories should coordinate with one another if they have reason to
believe their activities will cause harmful interference or if they
believe the activities of another state will cause harmful interference.167 The most important contribution of this section is the
idea of a safety zone—“[t]he area wherein this notification and
coordination will be implemented to avoid harmful interference.”168 The Accords state that a safety zone’s size, scope, and
duration should be tailored to the specific activity taking place
and that states must notify each other and the Secretary-General
of the U.N. of the “establishment, alteration, or end of any safety
zone, consistent with Article XI of the Outer Space Treaty.”169
The Accords also note that “[t]he Signatories commit to respect
the principle of free access to all areas of celestial bodies and all
other provisions of the Outer Space Treaty in their use of safety
zones.”170 Mike Gold also emphasized this point, stating that “it’s
very important to understand what the Accords aren’t, which is
in any way, shape, or form a stay-out zone or an exclusionary
zone or anything that would hamper the free access on a celes163
164
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tial body, which is required by the Outer Space Treaty.”171 He
went on to state that “[i]t’s simply a requirement to notify and
again to coordinate to avoid harmful interference, which are existing obligations underneath the Outer Space Treaty.”172
Deconfliction of activities is a prime example of an area where
the U.S. uses the Accords to operationalize the Outer Space
Treaty. Article IX of the Outer Space Treaty requires states to
use “due regard” and avoid “harmful interference” in their activities in outer space, but what that means exactly is unclear.173
The Accords seek to fill in those gaps and establish the concept
of safety zones in due regard.174 Safety zones are not something
NASA came up with on its own, but rather the Accords borrow
heavily from The Hague International Space Resources Governance Working Group’s 2019 Building Blocks for the Development of an International Framework on Space Resource
Activities.175 Section 11.3 of that framework provides:
Taking into account the principle of non-appropriation under
Article II [of the Outer Space Treaty], the international framework should permit States and international organizations responsible for space resource activities to establish a safety zone,
or other area-based safety measure, around an area identified for
a space resource activity as necessary to assure safety and to avoid
any harmful interference with that space resource activity. Such
safety measure shall not impede the free access, in accordance
with international law, to any area of outer space by personnel,
vehicles and equipment of another operator. In accordance with
the area-based safety measure, a State or international organization may restrict access for a limited period of time, provided
that timely public notice has been given setting out the reasons
for such restriction.176

An analogous concept exists in maritime law, where the U.N.
Convention on the Law of the Sea provides for a 500-meter
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safety zone around offshore oil and gas facilities.177 As the U.S.
draws perhaps the strongest connection between the Accords
and the Outer Space Treaty and makes explicit that the U.S.
seeks to establish a recognition of safety zones not just as an
obligation of the Accords, but as an obligation that all parties to
the Outer Space Treaty must recognize as part of Article IX’s
mandate to use due regard and avoid harmful interference.178
Concerns certainly exist about safety zones turning into de facto
areas of national appropriation or influence, which is a perception that NASA will have to be intentional about addressing.
Another small but important way that the U.S. seeks to use the
Accords’ provisions on deconfliction of activities to incorporate
and build on the Outer Space Treaty is that, technically, the
Outer Space Treaty does not impose an obligation to avoid harmful interference on states.179 Article IX of the Outer Space
Treaty strictly requires states to consult with one another if they
think their activities may cause harmful interference.180 It says
nothing about actually avoiding harmful interference. Yet, one
can imagine a situation in which parties consult about harmful
interference but are unable to reach an agreement, and thus
harmful interference occurs even though the Outer Space
Treaty’s technical obligations have been satisfied. The Accords
go a step further and explicitly require signatories “to seek to
refrain from any intentional actions that may create harmful interference with each other’s use of outer space.”181 While this is
a minor change, it is an important one that could have serious
implications for international relations and governance in
space.
The tenth and final principle enshrined in the Accords relates
to orbital debris.182 This section simply states that nations that
partner in the Artemis Program must “commit to plan for the
mitigation of orbital debris,” and to “limit, to the extent practicable, the generation of new, long-lived harmful debris.”183
While there is no direct analog in any of the outer space treaties,
177 Mikhail Kashubsky & Anthony Morrison, Security of Offshore Oil and Gas Facilities: Exclusion Zones and Ships’ Routeing, 5 AUSTL. J. MAR. & OCEAN AFFS. 1, 2
(2013).
178 ARTEMIS ACCORDS, supra note 6, at 5–6.
179 See Outer Space Treaty, supra note 5, at 2416–17.
180 Id.
181 ARTEMIS ACCORDS, supra note 6, at 6.
182 Id.
183 Id.
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Article IX of the Outer Space Treaty discusses avoiding the
“harmful contamination” of outer space, which mitigating orbital debris certainly seeks to accomplish.184 NASA has noted its
aspiration to “do better in space than we have on Earth” when it
comes to debris management.185 This section encourages NASA
and its partners to be mindful of orbital debris and the environment when conducting activities in outer space.186 Although a
relatively benign provision, it could serve to put the squeeze on
nations like China and India that, at least here on Earth, have
less-than-stellar track records when it comes to respecting the
environment.187
The Accords thus represent the United States’ attempt to lay
down, under the auspices of the Outer Space Treaty and the
other U.N. treaties on outer space, general principles for the
civil exploration and use of outer space. These principles vary in
the degree of connection they share to the Outer Space Treaty.
However, the U.S. consistently and forcefully maintains that the
Accords are simply an outgrowth of the Outer Space Treaty, a
way to operationalize and enforce compliance with the Outer
Space Treaty, and are in no way significant or to be interpreted
apart from the Outer Space Treaty.188 This reveals the United
States’ true intent with the Accords: to establish a U.S.-centric
legal framework and system of good governance in outer space
that is binding on all nations.
VI.

USING THE ARTEMIS ACCORDS TO BUILD
CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW

By cloaking the Accords with the authority and legitimacy of
the Outer Space Treaty, the U.S. seeks to use the Accords to
build customary international law, which would bind not only
parties to the Accords but also non-parties in their use and exploration of outer space. The U.S. has this unique opportunity
because (1) the Outer Space Treaty speaks only to general principles and is thus ripe for elaboration and operationalization,
and (2) the U.S. is the first-mover in this space, launching the
Outer Space Treaty, supra note 5, at 2416.
Space Ct. Found., supra note 113, at 21:27.
186 ARTEMIS ACCORDS, supra note 6, at 6.
187 See Leeza Mangaldas, India and China Both Struggle with Deadly Pollution—But
Only One Fights It, FORBES (Oct. 27, 2017, 1:15 PM), forbes.com/sites/leezamangaldas/2017/10/25/india-and-china-both-struggle-with-deadly-pollution-butonly-one-is-fighting-it/?sh=70949c85707a [https://perma.cc/25W4-ZE9Z].
188 See ARTEMIS ACCORDS, supra note 6, at 2.
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first mission to return humans to the Moon since 1972.189 The
U.S. must capitalize on the opportunity to build a new legal regime and system of good governance in outer space, specifically
working to build recognition and consensus around disclosure
of scientific data, space resource extraction, and deconfliction
of activities.
Custom plays an important role in the international legal system. Indeed, Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court
of Justice formally recognizes custom as a source of international law, including “international custom, as evidence of a
general practice accepted as law” among its list of the sources of
international law.190 Customary international law “describes the
body of rules that nations in the international community ‘universally abide by, or accede to, out of a sense of legal obligation
and mutual concern.’ ”191 Customary international law consists
of two components:
First, there must be a general and consistent practice of states.
This does not mean that the practice must be universally followed; rather it should reflect wide acceptance among the states
particularly involved in the relevant activity. Second, there must
be a sense of legal obligation, or opinio juris sive necessitatis. In
other words, a practice that is generally followed but which states
feel legally free to disregard does not contribute to customary
law; rather, there must be a sense of legal obligation. States must
follow the practice because they believe it is required by international law, not merely because that they think it is a good idea, or
politically useful, or otherwise desirable.192

Thus, the two elements necessary to create customary international law are state practice and opinio juris. State practice is developed by “the states particularly involved in the relevant
activity” acting in a certain way over some time, establishing a
normal course of conduct.193 That element will undoubtedly be
met through the Accords—the U.S. and its partners will develop
state practice around the Accords by acting underneath and
consistent with the obligations of the Accords when conducting
their activities in outer space. The broader, more extensive, and
See ARTEMIS PLAN, supra note 1, at 22.
Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 38, ¶ 1(b), June 26, 1945,
59 Stat. 1055, 33 U.N.T.S. 933.
191 Viet. Ass’n for Victims of Agent Orange v. Dow Chem. Co., 517 F.3d 104,
116 (2d Cir. 2008) (quoting Flores v. S. Peru Copper Corp., 414 F.3d 233, 248
(2d Cir. 2003)).
192 United States v. Bellaizac-Hurtado, 700 F.3d 1245, 1252 (11th Cir. 2012).
193 Id.
189
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more diverse a coalition the U.S. can assemble under the Accords, the stronger the state practice element becomes.
The concept of opinio juris is a bit more elusive, but it is essentially “the conviction of states that a particular practice is obligatory or accepted as law.”194 The U.S. approach of continually
discussing the Accords as an outgrowth or extension of the
Outer Space Treaty becomes relevant here for purposes of international law. The U.S. could have pursued the Accords separate
and independent from any of the five U.N. treaties on outer
space. It could have emphasized that the Accords were simply
agreements between the U.S. and its partners working on the
Artemis Program—nothing more, nothing less. While this
would contribute to state practice, it would not trigger any opinio
juris. States would be acting in a given way because the Accords
demanded it, not because they thought they had to act that way
consistent with their obligations under international law. However, the United States’ repeated overtures to the Outer Space
Treaty in the Accords provide the missing link that helps create
opinio juris around the Accords. Now, partners in the Artemis
Program will be acting in a certain way not only because the
Accords require them to but also out of a sense that the Outer
Space Treaty also requires them to act that way. For example,
states will respect and honor safety zones because they believe
that is the only way to be consistent with their obligations under
Article IX of the Outer Space Treaty to use due regard and
avoid harmful interference.195 It is in this way that the U.S. will
be able to use the Accords to begin building a U.S.-centric regime of laws and good governance in outer space through customary international law.
One area where the U.S. should seek to use the Accords to
establish legally binding customs is scientific data disclosure.
While the Outer Space Treaty does not explicitly mention this,
NASA has emphasized that it is “very much in the spirit of the
treaty.”196 Disclosure of scientific data is something that NASA
has always done,197 and incentivizing countries—including
China and Russia—to disclose scientific data related to their activities in outer space would not only spur innovation and promote the sharing of ideas, but it would also lead to more
194 Jo Lynn Slama, Note, Opinio Juris in Customary International Law, 15 OKLA.
CITY UNIV. L. REV. 603, 605 (1990).
195 See ARTEMIS ACCORDS, supra note 6, at 5.
196 Space Ct. Found., supra note 113, at 13:47.
197 Id. at 13:49.
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transparency, accountability, safety, and stability in outer space.
These are values that the U.S. should seek to promote. However,
because the Outer Space Treaty is silent on this principle, the
U.S. and its partners will have to argue that the penumbra requires disclosure of scientific data of the Outer Space Treaty. It
remains to be seen how effective this will be in establishing
opinio juris. Still, extensive state practice surrounding scientific
data disclosure will lay the foundation for that principle to become legally binding. It can generate enormous peer pressure
to coerce states into compliance.
Another area where the U.S. should seek to build customary
international law is resource extraction. As discussed in the previous Section, the jury is still out internationally on whether the
Outer Space Treaty permits the extraction and use of space resources.198 The U.S. is not waiting for an international consensus to form but rather is forming that consensus itself. On the
one hand, this reflects a sort of common-sense realization that
to establish a sustainable long-term presence on the Moon, astronauts will need to live off the land. The south pole of the
Moon contains vast quantities of water ice that will need to be
harvested and utilized to sustain human operations. It was not
that long ago that scientists thought the Moon was bone-dry;
there are undoubtedly many more mysteries that the Moon will
reveal as we begin to explore it more thoroughly, and we must
be able to take advantage of those potential opportunities.
The U.S. push for resource extraction in outer space also reflects that the United States’ domestic private space industry is
by far the most dominant on Earth. Jeff Bezos and Elon Musk
are just two names pouring billions of dollars into private space
exploration.199 Space resource extraction must be accepted
under international space law and must take place under a stable and conducive legal regime to ultimately monetize and realize the full potential of this industry. The U.S. has every
incentive to use the Accords to begin crafting that regime, being
careful and intentional about portraying the source of that regime as the Outer Space Treaty and not the Accords themselves.
Even without identifying a positive source for the regime in the
Outer Space Treaty, this can be accomplished by simply reinSee supra Part V.
Kara Swisher, Why Are Elon Musk and Jeff Bezos So Interested in Space?, N.Y.
TIMES (Feb. 26, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/02/26/opinion/marsnasa-musk.html [https://perma.cc/8U3A-6UMD].
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forcing that the U.S.-crafted regime respects the Outer Space
Treaty and does not run afoul of any of its provisions. The U.S.
would prefer to avoid negotiations about this issue with China or
Russia, who will undoubtedly be looking for ways to hamstring
the U.S. domestic space industry. Thus, forging ahead with the
Artemis Program and the Accords allows the U.S. to build accepted practice around space resource extraction and then leverage that emerging custom if and when the time comes to have
these conversations in a multilateral forum.
A final area where the U.S. should focus on building customary international law through the Accords is the deconfliction of
activities. This is an area of great opportunity for the U.S. because the Accords’ section on deconfliction of activities is directly rooted in Article IX of the Outer Space Treaty, which
admonishes its signatories to conduct their activities in outer
space with “due regard to the corresponding interests of all
other States” and to avoid causing “harmful interference with
activities of other States.”200 Due regard and harmful interference are very amorphous concepts. The U.S. has the opportunity with the Accords to operationalize Article IX and establish
conclusively for international space law what it means to use due
regard and avoid harmful interference.
The way the U.S. has set out to do this is through safety
zones.201 The exact parameters of a given safety zone will have to
be determined by reference to the particular activity being conducted, leveraging generally accepted engineering and scientific
principles.202 As a general matter, however, safety zones will be
the area around a given activity (be it mining, drilling, or something else) in which harmful interference could occur.203 Safety
zones can exist either on the surface of celestial bodies or in
cislunar space.204 Safety zones will notify all other nations that a
sensitive activity is taking place and establish a per se rule that
any intrusion into the safety zone will cause harmful interference with the activity being conducted.205 This idea is based
heavily on The Hague International Space Resources GovernOuter Space Treaty, supra note 5, at 2416–17.
See ARTEMIS ACCORDS, supra note 6, at 5.
202 Id. at 5–6.
203 Id. at 5.
204 Id. at 5.
205 Leonard David, NASA Proposes New Rules for Moon-Focused Space Race, SCI. AM.
(May 21, 2020), https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/nasa-proposes-newrules-for-moon-focused-space-race/ [https://perma.cc/3FAL-DUHZ].
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ance Working Group; specifically, their 2019 report entitled
“Building Blocks for the Development of an International
Framework on Space Resource Activities,” mentioned above.206
Safety zones are also a component of international maritime law
under the U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea, which provides for a 500-meter safety zone around offshore oil and gas
platforms to avoid harmful interference.207 Under the Accords,
states must notify each other and the Secretary-General of the
U.N. of any safety zone, coordinate with other nations, and modify and curtail the scope of the safety zone as the nature of the
operation being conducted changes.208
Safety zones will need to be utilized in a way that does not
conflict with Article II of the Outer Space Treaty’s prohibition
on national appropriation or Article I’s requirement that “free
access to all areas of celestial bodies” be protected.209 It is in the
United States’ interest that the regime that develops around
safety zones respects both of these principles. Perception in this
regard is just as—if not more—important than reality. First, if
countries perceive that safety zones are really just zones of national influence, they will be less likely to sign on to the Accords
and more likely to view them as simply a unilateral effort by the
U.S. to advance its own interests in outer space. Second, if safety
zones turn into de facto zones of appropriation, this will severely
weaken the United States’ ability to credibly claim that the Accords are simply an outgrowth of the Outer Space Treaty, as the
principles of Article I and Article II are so well enshrined in the
Treaty and in international space law that violating those principles would show that the U.S. is fundamentally unserious about
creating a new regime of good governance consistent with the
Outer Space Treaty. Third, the potential for abuse of safety
zones as areas of national appropriation by bad actors in outer
space far outweighs any potential benefit that would accrue to
the U.S. under such a scheme.
Safety zones represent the United States’ best opportunity to
operationalize Article IX of the Outer Space Treaty’s provisions
on due regard and harmful interference and begin creating customary international law around deconfliction of activities. Creating such a regime is critical to the peaceful, stable, and
206
207
208
209

The Hague Int’l Space Res. Governance Working Grp., supra note 175, at 4.
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predictable exploration of outer space going forward. First,
widespread recognition of and respect for safety zones as a requirement of Article IX of the Outer Space Treaty will severely
limit the ability of bad actors to cause problems in outer space.
Instead of having to decipher on an ad hoc basis what the intentions of a given nation might be in outer space, safety zones create a per se rule that any intrusion into them constitutes
harmful interference in violation of the Outer Space Treaty.210
Second, the United States’ private domestic space industry is
dominant compared to other nations. For this industry to realize its full potential from both economic and power-projection
perspectives, there must be a stable regime in place to protect
these U.S. interests. Creation and recognition of safety zones
must be a central piece of the U.S.-centric good governance regime in outer space that the Accords seek to establish.
Establishing a governance regime around safety zones
through the Accords also has implications for the Accords’ ability to create customary international law generally. The Accords’
provisions on deconfliction of activities contain the most overlap
with the Outer Space Treaty. The Outer Space Treaty’s Article
IX requirements that states use “due regard” and avoid “harmful
interference” are vague and are, therefore, ripe for interpretation and operationalization.211 Because of this vagueness, the
U.S. can claim with perhaps more credibility than in other areas
that Section 11 of the Accords is entirely consistent with and a
logical outgrowth of the Outer Space Treaty. In sum, the deep
connection between Section 11 of the Accords and Article IX of
the Outer Space Treaty will strengthen across the United States’
claims that the Accords derive their legitimacy from the Outer
Space Treaty, which will facilitate and strengthen the development of customary international law under the Accords, specifically the opinio juris component.
The U.S. must take advantage of its status as the first mover in
this space to use the Accords to begin building customary international law surrounding important issues like disclosure of scientific data, resource extraction, and deconfliction of activities.
The U.S. cannot wait for an international consensus around
these issues but must instead form that consensus itself. Using
the Accords to build a U.S.-centric regime of good governance
in outer space is the best way to ensure a stable, peaceful, and
210
211
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prosperous future that benefits not only the U.S. and its interests but humanity at large.
VII.

INTERNATIONAL RESPONSES

The Accords are unlikely to create new geopolitical rifts but
can deepen existing tensions between states. On the other hand,
the Accords provide a great opportunity for nations with
fledgling space programs to become serious players in outer
space going forward. Additionally, the broader the coalition that
the U.S. can assemble under the Accords, the more likely that
the Accords will allow the U.S. to establish a binding regime of
U.S.-centric good governance in outer space and advance its interpretation of the Outer Space Treaty on the international
stage.
The two nations with the biggest incentives to oppose the Accords are China and Russia. The United States’ rivalry with
China on the international stage is not new, and its competition
with Russia, specifically in outer space, goes back even further.212 Both nations have already spoken publicly about their
opposition to the Accords. Ma Zhanyuan, a professor at the Chinese University of Law and Political Science, “acknowledged the
need for an international framework governing extraction of
space resources,” but said that attempts by the U.S. to “formulate its own laws to allow the extraction of space resources . . .
will harm the interests of other countries.”213 Chinese observers
called the Accords an “unembellished and ‘preposterous attempt’ ” to unilaterally set ground rules for lunar resource extraction.214 Another Chinese military and aerospace
commentator, Song Zhongping, went even further, saying,
“[t]he US is developing a new space version of an ‘Enclosure
Movement,’ in pursuit of colonization and claiming sovereignty
over the [M]oon,” referring to the privatization of common
land in 18th-century Britain, and criticizing the United States’
“ ‘Cold War’ mentality.”215 Notably, any attempt at cooperation
between the U.S. and China on outer space may be preempted
See infra Part II.
Elliot Ji, Michael B. Cerny, & Raphael J. Piliero, What Does China Think About
NASA’s Artemis Accords?, DIPLOMAT (Sept. 17, 2020), https://thediplomat.com/
2020/09/what-does-china-think-about-nasas-artemis-accords/ [https://
perma.cc/U9YJ-4ZUJ].
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215 Deng Xiaoci, Trump Administration’s ‘Artemis Accords’ Expose Political Agenda of
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by the Wolf Amendment, which Congress passed in 2011 restricting NASA’s ability to cooperate with Chinese state
agencies.216
The Russian government has largely echoed its Chinese counterpart on the Accords. The head of Russia’s space agency, director general of Roscosmos, Dmitry Rogozin, has criticized the
Accords as being too “U.S.-centric” for the Russians to participate in.217 Roscosmos said in another statement that “ ‘attempts
to expropriate outer space and aggressive plans to actually take
over other planets’ deter international cooperation” in outer
space.218 Sergei Savelyev, deputy head in charge of international
cooperation at Roscosmos, stated that “[t]here have already
been examples in history when one country decided to start seizing territories in its own interests and everyone remembers how
that turned out,”219 an interesting statement given that his own
country is still under crippling international sanctions after its
illegal annexation of Crimea in 2014.220 Director General
Rogozin laid it bare in a Twitter post, saying that “[t]he principle of invasion is the same, whether it be the Moon or Iraq. The
creation of a ‘coalition of the willing’ is initiated . . . . Only Iraq
TIMES (May 7, 2020), https://www.globaltimes.cn/content/1187654.shtml
[https://perma.cc/3VLS-B663]; Ji et al., supra note 213.
216 Department of Defense and Full-Year Continuing Appropriations Act, 2011,
Pub. L. No. 112-10, § 1340(a), 125 Stat. 38, https://www.congress.gov/112/
plaws/publ10/PLAW-112publ10.pdf. [https://perma.cc/3SR5-CNSZ]. Section
1340(a) provides that:
None of the funds made available by this division may be used for
the National Aeronautics and Space Administration or the Office of
Science and Technology Policy to develop, design, plan, promulgate, implement, or execute a bilateral policy, program, order, or
contract of any kind to participate, collaborate, or coordinate bilaterally in any way with China or any Chinese-owned company unless
such activities are specifically authorized by a law enacted after the
date of enactment of this division.
217 Jeff Foust, Russia Skeptical About Participating in Lunar Gateway, SPACENEWS
(Oct. 12, 2020), https://spacenews.com/russia-skeptical-about-participating-inlunar-gateway/#:%7E:text=WASHINGTON%20--%20The%20head
%20of%20Russia’s,existing%20International%20Space%20Station%20partnership [https://perma.cc/5G5U-NF8Z].
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MOSCOW TIMES (Apr. 7, 2020), https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2020/04/07/
russia-compares-trumps-space-mining-order-to-colonialism-a69901 [https://
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or Afghanistan will come out of this.”221 Needless to say, the Russians do not seem thrilled with the United States’ maneuvering
under the Accords.
Chinese and Russian opposition to the Accords flows from
three main areas of concern. First, China and Russia criticize the
Accords for not being negotiated in a true multilateral fashion.222 The text of the Accords was negotiated among the U.S.
and the seven initial partners it invited to participate, and each
subsequent signatory will have to accede to that language as it
is.223 China and Russia are likely to use COPUOS as a forum to
raise these concerns about multilateralism and may try to initiate the development of a different legal regime in that forum or
come up with legal regimes of their own to try and counter the
Accords. The U.S. needs to be prepared for one potentiality if
China and/or Russia join the Moon Agreement. Recall that the
Moon Agreement is largely considered to be a failed exercise
given that only eighteen states have ratified it.224 The Moon
Agreement also seems, by its terms, to preclude resource extraction in outer space of the kind authorized by the Accords.225
However, because the Moon Agreement was negotiated at the
U.N. and thus has the veneer of multilateral legitimacy, China
or Russia joining the Moon Agreement could pressure the U.S.
vis-à-vis advancing its interpretation of the Outer Space Treaty
allowing resource extraction.226 This would likely be a last-ditch
effort by China or Russia, however, as both of these nations realize the importance of space resource extraction going forward
and would prefer not to hamstring themselves by acceding to
the Moon Agreement in an attempt to hinder the U.S. However,
if either nation feels as though it is unable to effectively counter
the United States’ resource extraction regime in other ways and
221 Joey Roulette, ‘Star Trek, Not Star Wars:’ NASA Releases Basic Principles for
Moon Exploration Pact, REUTERS (May 15, 2020), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-space-exploration-artemis/star-trek-not-star-wars-nasa-releases-basic-principles-for-moon-exploration-pact-idUSKBN22R2Z9 [https://perma.cc/7X6WSAN7].
222 Christopher Newman, Artemis Accords: Why Many Countries are Refusing to
Sign Moon Exploration Agreement, CONVERSATION (Oct. 19, 2020, 7:45 AM), https://
theconversation.com/artemis-accords-why-many-countries-are-refusing-to-signmoon-exploration-agreement-148134 [https://perma.cc/W48P-3DK4].
223 See Davenport, supra note 7.
224 Listner, supra note 79.
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feels threatened enough by that regime, they may decide that
the Moon Agreement is worth signing.
Second, “international willingness to participate in the
[A]ccords reaffirms the U.S.’s dominance of the space geopolitical sphere.”227 This is particularly so because, as discussed above,
the Accords were not negotiated in a multilateral forum but instead by the U.S. and a few of its close partners. As Cassandra
Steer, Mission Specialist with the Australian National University
Institute for Space pointed out, it was largely the failure to involve the international community in the drafting process that
caused the European Union’s 2008 Draft International Code of
Conduct for Outer Space Activities to fail to launch.228 That attempt to establish norms of behavior in outer space, like the
Accords, was unveiled to the international community only after
the text had been drafted internally by European Union member states.229 The fact that the Accords have received such a high
level of traction even though they were not negotiated in a true
multilateral fashion “highlights the extraordinary pull the
United States has when it comes to space exploration, thus confirming China’s and Russia’s fears: The U.S. continues to be the
leader in space geopolitics.”230 This fact provides every incentive
for Russia and China to try to undercut the Accords at every
turn.
Finally, the Accords divide the international community between those who agree with the United States’ interpretation of
the Outer Space Treaty as allowing resource extraction and
those who do not.231 As discussed earlier, if a consensus forms
around the U.S. interpretation, it could be sufficient to create
binding customary international law, which would benefit the
U.S. at the expense of Russia and China, given how dominant
the United States’ private domestic space sector is. Russia and
China will seek to oppose this interpretation and may offer their
visions for resource extraction in outer space or may even sign
the Moon Agreement in an attempt to thwart the U.S. For many
of these same reasons, Russia and China will also be concerned
227 Almudena Azcárate Ortega, Artemis Accords: A Step Toward International Cooperation or Further Competition?, LAWFARE (Dec. 15, 2020, 10:25 AM), https://
www.lawfareblog.com/artemis-accords-step-toward-international-cooperation-orfurther-competition [https://perma.cc/N3CA-8CRL].
228 Space Ct. Found., supra note 113, at 53:35.
229 See id.
230 Ortega, supra note 227.
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about the U.S. advancing its concept of safety zones as due regard under Article IX of the Outer Space Treaty. While competition in outer space between Russia, China, and the U.S. is
nothing new, the Accords may trigger a new round of more
overt conflict and certainly add an urgency and imminency element to the geopolitical tensions between the nations.
The Accords also present an opportunity for nations with
fledgling space programs to become more influential players in
outer space in the future. Countries have significant economic
and political incentives to join the U.S. coalition. This is especially true for nascent space programs regarding the Accords’
commitment to sharing scientific data, which would allow these
new space programs to develop much more quickly than if they
had to start from scratch.232 For example, Luxembourg enacted
a law in 2017 that allows for space mining, and joining the Accords will certainly jumpstart its space mining efforts.233 The
United Arab Emirates’ founded its space program in 2014, and
the Accords represent an opportunity for it to develop its space
program while deepening international ties quickly.234 Likewise,
Australia’s space program is only three years old, but by joining
the Accords, Australia will have a clear opportunity to gain relevance as a spacefaring power.235 Thus, while some critics allege
that the Accords represent an exclusive club that overlooks the
interests of non-spacefaring nations, the Accords can be an opportunity for states with nascent space programs to gain operational capacity and relevance on the global stage quickly.
Finally, the U.S. will need to build as broad and diverse a coalition under the Accords as possible to use the Accords to build
customary international law. Immediate targets for the U.S.
should be the European Space Agency (ESA) and the Indian
Space Research Organisation. The European Space Agency is a
natural partner for the U.S., and indeed many ESA member
states are already party to the Accords.236 Unsurprisingly, the
ESA has not yet signed on to the Accords, as “[t]he ambitious
US deadline for the project will clash with the lengthy consultation of the 17 member states required for the ESA to sign on as
a whole.”237 Getting the ESA on board will certainly go a long
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way to bolstering the legitimacy and force of the Accords. Similarly, India would be an excellent partner for the U.S. in the
Accords. As the world’s largest democracy with a relatively established space program, India would add a different layer of legitimacy to the Accords that bringing other European nations on
board would not. India’s warmer relationships with Russia and
China would also benefit the U.S. From a diversity perspective,
the U.S. needs to continue courting South American nations.
Securing a partnership with an African nation would also round
out the Accords and add further legitimacy to the U.S.’s efforts.
In sum, the Accords are likely to increase tensions with China
and Russia in the short term, as each of those nations has strong
incentives to oppose the U.S.-led governance regime that the
Accords seek to create. At the same time, the Accords present a
great opportunity for nations with fledgling space programs to
quickly operationalize and gain relevance, especially concerning
disclosure of scientific data. The U.S. will also need to continue
to aggressively seek to expand its coalition under the Accords if
it will be successful in using the Accords as a vehicle for establishing binding customary international law.
VIII.

CONCLUSION

With the announcement of its Artemis Program, the U.S. has
kicked off a new era in space exploration. The ambitious project
seeks to put the first woman on the Moon and send humans to
Mars for the first time. These exciting opportunities necessitate
a strong legal and good governance regime to manage the
peaceful conduct of activities in outer space. To implement the
Program, the U.S. will execute a series of bilateral agreements
with its partners called the Accords, which represent the United
States’ vision for a code of conduct in outer space. By casting the
Accords as an outgrowth of the Outer Space Treaty and incorporating provisions from the other U.N. treaties on outer space,
the U.S. seeks to use the Accords to build customary international law through state practice and opinio juris in essential areas like disclosure of scientific data, resource extraction, and
deconfliction of activities. The United States’ success will primarily be a function of how broad and diverse a coalition it can
assemble under the Accords and how it can manage adversarial
responses from nations like China and Russia. Using the Accords to build customary international law through the Outer
Space Treaty represents the best path forward for the U.S., as
constructing a strong, U.S.-centric legal and good governance
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regime in outer space is the best way to protect the United
States’ interests in the future and to secure peace and stability in
the final frontier.

